Intelligence
Stay TunedFORT HOOD, TX—Following Army psychologist Nidal Malik Hasan’s shooting rampage on the Fort Hood military base last week that left 13 people dead and 30 others injured, fellow Muslims across the nation sent him a message today, saying “thanks a fucking bunch, asshole,” to the 39-year-old killer. “Hey, great, eight years of progress right down the shitter,” St. Cloud, MN resident Zahida Naseem said at one of dozens of impromptu rallies held nationwide. “And you just had to scream ‘Allahu Akbar’ while you did it, didn’t you? May as well have put on a turban and rode a fucking camel right through the army base, you dick. Thanks for making the foreseeable future a living hell for normal, peace-loving Muslims in this country. Really appreciate it!” American Sikhs are also reportedly enraged with Hasan, and an official statement from the National Sikh Heritage Center read, in part, “look, we got nothing to do with that guy.”
Piaroh-Cze:
If only everyone bears in mind that thoughtlessness is a greater sin than godlessness.
I’ll assume you read the whole essay below by Prof Bryan Caplan. If you’ve not, please do. Otherwise, thtre’s no point in continuing with this post.
I’m not going to rubbish it, if that’s what you’re thinking. You might want to try the TOC for that, you’ll find that there are many angry people hanging around that site who are glad to oblige you.
I’m especially pleased by the fact that we had managed to, quite independently of each other, I might add, made similar observations and conclusions on the city-state conundrum. Flattering. Unfortunately I don’t lecture senior civil servants.
A little background on the man as well. He is a libertarian, which means that he holds that all things being equal, minimal government intervention is ideal. I can’t say for sure, but he also has a reputation for mildly anarchist tendencies. That such a person could resist spitting venom at Singapore’s big-government situation is already remarkable in itself, let alone his series of lectures and interactions with civil servants.
Which brings up another matter. Not to question his credentials as an academic, but by his own admission he spends 80% of his time in Singapore around our civil servants. I can only wonder if such a non-representative circle could had presented to him an accurate picture of our island?
Not that it matters, given the subject content. He has, as a academic rightly should, chosen to focus solely on the principles and methods of our frankly autocratic governance, as well as their apparent theoretical irreconcilability with economic success, which the PAP has over the last 50 years gone out of its way to disprove. He isn’t commenting on the effects of specific policies, nor the calibre of our MPS, and only indirectly addresses the state of the local opposition. He has concerned himself only with the government model, which in any case can only be understood in an abstract sense, and anything so abstract removes the ground to irrelevance.
But it doesn’t end here. As an external observer, it would not be much to ask to agree that he would likely to more impartial than most local political pundits, given his lack of sympathies. then again, there is the age-old argument that in being removed he lacks an intimacy of knowledge and sentiment necessary to form an accurate picture.
Hence the conundrum. Perfect impartiality versus perfect information, and we may choose only one. Much like how standing close to a painting affords you to scrutinize even the minutest brush and detail, but standing further away would give you the full picture.
This question is an age-old one for a reason. There is frankly no satisfactory answer I can offer, but the onus is on each of us to bear the problem in mind while we chew over our thoughts.
Leaving such whims aside, there is one way to completely smash the entire argument from Prof Caplan. One need only accept that the organs of our city-state, the civil service and judiciary, are illegitimate extensions of PAP power.
It is, however, a premise which begs the question. In attempting to show that the PAP is corrupt, or actually a totalitarian dynasty in disguise, one makes the claim that it has illegally co-opted the organs of the state. In order for such a claim to be true, the PAP and the organs must either be corrupt, or attempting to maintain a totalitarian dynasty. The premise presumes the conclusion, and I find that the statement cannot be accepted as an argument.
True, that the reverse is true if we are to try and make a case that says the PAP is not corrupt, and is fully democratic. But unfortunately for the detractor the onus is on him to prove the guilt and not on the defendant to prove his innocence.
Prof Caplan’s view that Singapore’s civil service is by and large incorrupt, or at least has suppressed corruption to barely noticeable levels, easily draws immense ire from detractors, who self-righteously point out that the same civil servants draw fat pay packets from the government, funded by taxes. Prof Caplan stands accused of neglect in his analysis. Not even an academic can claim protection.
But the detractors miss the point. For one thing, they have again begged the question, this time using the wrong premise for the same conclusion. Ensuring that the top remains well-paid is the main strategy adopted for staving off corruption; indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that such was the primary reason for the fat pay packets in the first place. It is otherwise difficult to explain away why MM Lee and SM Goh routinely stress to Chinese ministers the importance of paying their civil service well to keep corruption at bay.
For another, in corruption and bribery the issue is that the official is accepting revenue from an unofficial source, one that constitutes a conflict of interest with his job. Then a government’s generous pay cannot be considered corruption or bribery at all, in fact there is no problem with it, since the government is the paymaster anyway. There is no conflict of interest.
Certainly, there exists the counter-argument (which I frankly doubt the vast majority of the hotheads have the perception, intelligence, temperament, postivism or simple good sense to see it for themselves) that given the dominant-party system, there is no distinguishing from the Singapore government and the PAP, so the high pay can also be seen as a ‘bonus’ being dispensed by the party for its own benefit, using tax money.
Valid? Yes. Convincing? If you begin from the assumption or premise that the PAP is essentially malevolent, then certainly, but do be aware that you and the pro-PAP man now have nothing more to say to each other, you may as well be living on entirely different planets. Strong? No, tenuous at best, even if it is impossible to disprove, but it is also impossible to prove.
Prof Caplan’s essay may have its bases covered, but not really by its own virtue, more by the fact that it hasn’t been properly challenged. It’s winning by default, or perhaps by walkover.
It’s OK if you don’t detect the sarcasm.
Prof Caplan in his essay entirely neglected the GRC system. That cannot be forgiven, even for an academic in his ivory tower. GRCs are so unique to Singapore that I fail to understand how he could had missed them.
Here, the claim that it was imposed with the aim of ensuring that the PAP would remain in power, is at least as credible and as strong as it officially declared notion of being a bulwark against racial politics.
There has never been a satisfactory answer. It is not my business today to offer one, but only to offer some balance for both sides. That seems to be about done. Have I missed anything?
Piaroh-Cze:
The perpendicular view.
Below is an article written by Prof Bryan Caplan, a respected US economist of George Mason University who conducts PhD classes and often travels to Singapore for discussions on politics and economics with the local civil service. It was published in the TOC on 5 Nov 09, and however much I dislike them I don’t grudge articles for their writing.
Introduction: Singapore versus the Median Voter Model
Officially, Singapore is a democracy. When you compare it to almost any other democratic country, though, Singapore has two deeply puzzling features.
Puzzle #1: Singapore frequently adopts the kind of policies that economists would call “economically efficient, but politically unpopular.” For example, Singapore has (nearly) unilateral free trade, admits unusually large numbers of immigrants, supplies most medical care on a fee-for-service basis, means-tests most government assistance, imposes peak load pricing on roads, and fights recessions by cutting employers’ taxes.[i] In most democracies, advocatingany of these policies could easily cost a politician his job. In Singapore, policies like this have stood the test of time.
Puzzle #2: Even though it follows the forms of British parliamentary democracy, Singapore is effectively a one-party state. The People’s Action Party (PAP) has held uninterrupted power since the country gained Home Rule in 1959, and has never received less than 60% of the popular vote. Even more strikingly, the PAP has a near-monopoly in Singapore’s Parliament. In many electoral cycles, this party literally won 100% of the seats; it currently holds 82 out of 84.
To put these puzzles in perspective, we need to review the Median Voter Model, the workhorse of modern political economy. In the Median Voter Model, two political parties compete for votes by advocating a “platform” – a bundle of policies. Citizens in turn vote for the party with the platform closest to their ideal policy bundle. Setting aside various complications, [iii] the Median Voter Model has two strong and intuitive implications:
First, competing parties offer policy platforms that maximally appeal to centrist voters. To be more precise, they offer the platform that the median voter regards as ideal. If one party deviates from the preferences of the median voter, its rival can win for sure by sticking with the platform most desired by the median voter.
Second, no single party can consistently win elections. A rival party can always match a dominant party’s electoral success – i.e., win with 50% probability – simply by mimicking the platform of the dominant party.
Although the Median Voter Model abstracts from a great deal of institutional detail, it usually fits the facts well. In democracies around the world, political parties strive to identify and support policies that are moderate relative to public opinion. As a result, parties rarely achieve lasting political dominance. If one party’s policies turn out to be more popular than its rivals, those rivals quickly adjust their platforms to regain the public’s favor.
Now it should be clear why Singaporean political economy is so puzzling. It persistently adopts policies that the democratic process would overturn almost anywhere else on earth, but the same party keeps winning election after election by a landslide. Why doesn’t a rival party promise to abolish the PAP’s unpopular policies and soar to power? How, in short, is Singapore’s political-economic equilibrium possible?
Explanation #1: Singapore is Not Really a Democracy
The most obvious solution to these puzzles, to be blunt, is that Singapore is a thinly-veiled dictatorship. Despite its Westminsterian pedigree, it must officially ban competing parties, informally terrorize political rivals, and/or rig its elections. Lack of electoral constraints in turn allow Singapore’s government to adopt unpopular policies. In most dictatorships, of course, the government opts for policies that are economically inefficient and politically unpopular. But the Singaporeans got lucky: Its despots have been benevolent, or at least have a long time horizon.
The “Singapore as a thinly-veiled dictatorship” theory coheres neatly with Western stereotypes about the city-state, and elegantly resolves my two puzzles. Unfortunately, the dictatorship thesis ignores three basic facts.
First, Singapore has several legal opposition parties, including the Workers’ Party of Singapore, the Singapore Democratic Alliance, and the Singapore Malays National Organization. The only illegal party is the Communist Party of Malaya. As Mauzy and Milne observe:
The Singapore government has not committed any serious violations of civil rights. There have been no extrajudicial killings or political disappearances, and there are currently no political detainees.
The worst that Freedom House can say about Singapore’s democracy is that: “[T]he opposition is hamstrung by a ban on political films and television programs, the threat of libel suits, strict regulations on political associations, and the PAP’s influence on the media and the courts.” Activists in opposition parties face many minor indignities, but hardly live in mortal fear of the PAP.
At the margin, of course, PAP pressure deters some political talent from joining opposition parties. But this is a feeble explanation for the opposition’s near-total failure to gain political office. After all, there are many countries that have vigorous electoral competition even though their opposition candidates face great dangers. In Pakistan, for example, the reins of power have repeatedly changed hands via electoral channels even though opposition candidates have frequently faced arrest, execution, and assassination.
Second, while the PAP does place unusual restrictions on political expression, these restrictions shieldpeople from criticism, not policies. Opposition candidates who avoid personal attacks against PAP politicians can and do freely attack PAP policies as ineffective or unfair. An opposition candidate could safely campaign on a platform to abolish Electronic Road Pricing or slash immigration. Indeed, an opposition candidate could safely campaign on a platform to rein in politically-motivated defamation suits. In the Median Voter Model, embracing these positions would quickly usher opposition politicians into power – assuming, of course, that the median voter genuinely wants the changes in question.
Third, there is virtually no evidence that Singapore’s elections are corrupt. Indeed, international observers have consistently rated its government as one of the least corrupt in the world. The World Bank’sGovernance Matters data set, for example, gives Singapore stellar scores in “Rule of Law” and “Control of Corruption.” Despite Freedom House’s negative assessment of political freedom in Singapore, it grants that “elections are free from irregularities and vote rigging.” The Global Barometer country report for Singapore finds that 86% of Singaporeans believe that their country is either “a full democracy” or “a democracy, but with minor problems.” The same percentage agrees that the last election was either “completely free and fair,” or “free and fair, but with minor problems.” Yes, decades of one-party electoral dominance is normally is a strong symptom of electoral corruption, but not in Singapore.
Evidence from the World Values Survey, administered in Singapore in 2002, reinforces this conclusion. 18.7% of Singaporeans were “very satisfied” with “the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs” and another 72.7% were “fairly satisfied”; the comparable numbers for the United States in 1999 (the survey year closest to 2002) were 6.9% and 60.2%. Similarly, when asked whether their country “is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves,” or “for the benefit of all the people,” only 20.4% in Singapore say, “a few big interests,” versus 63.3% for the U.S. International observers may say that the United States is much more democratic than Singapore, but Americans are markedly less likely than Singaporeans to feel like their government delivers the results the public wants.
I do not mean to deny the many peculiarities of Singaporean politics. In most democracies, leading members of the opposition have successful careers and a serious chance of winning. In most democracies, the members of the ruling party respond to their opponents’ verbal abuse with more verbal abuse – not lawsuits. The government of Singapore partially owns the main newspapers and television stations, and practices a moderate form of censorship. My point, though, is that these peculiarities are largely irrelevant as far as the Median Voter Model is concerned. In Singapore, voters are free to vote for opposition candidates, and opposition candidates can safely advocate the elimination of unpopular policies. In the Median Voter Model, this is all you need for the will of the people to prevail.
Explanation #2: Singapore’s Voters Are Unusually Economically Literate
Many of Singapore’s policies are unpopular around the world, but they persistently survive the democratic test in Singapore. Once we accept reject the dictatorship hypothesis, the next obvious explanation for Singapore’s unusually efficient policies is its unusually economically literate public opinion. In my The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies I find that even in the relatively market-oriented United States, the market mechanism is unpopular, especially in international and labor markets. But why couldn’t Singapore be the exception that proves the rule? Who says there can’t be a country where the man in the street embraces the market mechanism, even for international and labor markets?
At the outset, it is worth pointing out that the “unusual economic literacy” hypothesis largely fails for the country where it is most plausible: Hong Kong. Consider: Hong Kong has been ranked the freest economy in the world since 1970, the earliest year covered by the Economic Freedom of the World data set. Under these laissez-faire policies, Hong Kong enjoyed decades of remarkable economic growth. One would expect this excellent performance, combined with status quo bias, would lead to popular support for laissez-faire policies. It does not: Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi find that a majority of Hong Kongers want to change many of its most distinctive policies: 57.6% favor a minimum wage, 68.4% favor price controls for necessities, 74.7% want more progressive taxation, and 75.5% want to “protect local industry against foreign competition.” Decades of success have failed to convince the citizens of the free trade capital of the world of the merits of free trade.
Given Singapore’s many economic, political, and cultural similarities to Hong Kong, it seems unlikely that Singaporean public opinion would be significantly better. Unfortunately, nothing comparable to the Hong Kong survey exists for Singapore. To the best of my knowledge, public opinion researchers have never conducted a detailed survey of Singaporeans’ economic beliefs. Still, the 2002 World Values Survey contains a few questions that allow us to assess the “unusual economic literacy” hypothesis in a preliminary way.
The evidence turns out to be mixed at best. Singaporeans are more likely to accept inequality to provide good incentives. When asked whether “incomes should be made more equal” or whether “we need larger income differences as incentives,” (higher scores on a 1-10 scale indicate greater support for incentives) Singaporeans’ average answer was 6.88, versus 5.72 for Americans. Singaporeans and Americans have virtually the same beliefs about the social benefits of competition. But Singaporeans are actuallyless sympathetic to private enterprise than Americans. When asked whether private ownership or government ownership should be increased (higher scores on 1-10 scale indicate greater support for government ownership), the average answer in Singapore was 4.75, versus 3.62 for the U.S.
While there is little public opinion data for specific policy questions, there is solid evidence that Singaporeans do not support Singapore’s unusually open immigration policy. In fact, Singaporeans favor a sharply more restrictive approach than Americans: Only 4.0% favor open borders, and just 24% are willing to admit immigrants “as long as jobs [are] available”; the comparable numbers in the United States are 12.4% and 44.8%. Mauzy and Milne confirm this pattern: “[A] 2000 poll of 500 Singaporeans conducted by Channel NewAsia found that 78 percent of respondents preferred a cut-back on immigration, mainly out of fear for their jobs.” Opposition parties clearly view anti-foreign populism as a vote magnet. As Mauzy and Milne (2002: 152) note: “All the opposition parties complained about jobs going to foreigners while Singaporeans were being laid off, and the SDP called for a ‘Singapore First’ hiring policy.”
Although there is little reason to believe that the Singaporean electorate is unusually economically literate, there is admittedly some indication that Singaporeans are unusually concerned about economic performance. 58.8% of Singaporeans say that “a high level of economic growth” should be their nation’s top priority; 48.6% of Americans say the same. Similarly, only 37.9% of Singaporeans – versus 65.2% of Americans – think it would be a “good thing” if people put “less emphasis on money and material possessions.” Once Singaporeans recognize the economic benefits of a policy, they seem more willing to support it; there just isn’t much evidence that their beliefs about polices’ economic benefits are especially astute.
More research is necessary to decisively reject the “unusual economic literacy” hypothesis. Surveys about the popularity of Singapore’s most distinctive policies would be helpful. Singaporean versions of high-quality instruments like the General Social Survey and the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy would be especially informative. Still, at this point the case for the “unusual economic literacy” hypothesis looks rather weak.
Explanation #3: Singapore’s Voters Are Unusually Loyal, Deferential, and/or Resigned
Even if Singaporean public opinion were unusually economically literate, it would still be hard to explain the dominance of the PAP. In the Median Voter Model, opposition parties’ best response would be to mimic the policies of the PAP, leaving voters indifferent. Singaporean politics plainly doesn’t work this way. It is hard to name any other democratic country where the ruling party has held power so firmly for so long.
Singapore seems to be in a class of its own as long as we think of it primarily as a country. But the picture changes radically if we instead think of Singapore as a city. In the United States, big city politics is often about as lopsided as Singaporean politics. Democratic mayors have won without interruption since 1931 in Chicago and 1964 in San Francisco. While the Democrats have failed to monopolize the mayor’s office in New York City, they have near-PAP dominance of the New York City Council: Democrats hold 45 out of 48 occupied seats. Note that in the Median Voter Model, this cannot be explained purely by the liberalism of urban voters. After all, why can’t the Republican parties in Democratic cities simply move sharply to the left?
In purely formal terms, a modified version of the Median Voter Model can easily account for one-party democracy. You simply need to assume that voters have not only policy preferences, but party preferences as well. Intuitively, this means that even if two parties offer identical policies, some voters still decidedly prefer one party to the other. If the median party preference favors one party over its competitors, the members of the favored party then have the slack or “wiggle room” to deviate from the public’s policy preferences without courting defeat in the next election. By itself, of course, “wiggle room” does not improve the quality of public policy; but well-informed and well-meaning politicians could use it to persistently deliver economically efficient but politically unpopular policies.
Why precisely would voters have these “party preferences”? The most straightforward interpretation is that party preferences reflect group identification or loyalty. Voters might see one party as being “their party,” just as they see the local sports team as “their team.” Another interpretation of party preferences is that they reflect deference – a belief in one party’s superior competence and/or intentions. This deference could stem from a successful track record, but it doesn’t have to; voters could also defer to politicians’ current traits, such as intelligence and charisma. A final, more pessimistic interpretation of party preferences is that they reflect resignation. A voter might favor one party over another not because he wants it to rule, but because he feels that resistance is futile. In the United States, people who sympathize with a third party rarely vote for it because “it has no chance of winning.” The same mindset could lead sympathetic Singaporeans to withhold their votes from opposition parties. Why vote for second party when “it has no chance of winning”?
Which interpretation – or mix of interpretations – best fits the realities of Singapore? Once again, it is difficult to resolve this question using current data. Empirical evidence relevant to the loyalty interpretation is particularly scarce. For the deference and resignation stories, however, there is some preliminary evidence to light our way.
Several different sources confirm the importance of deference in Singaporean politics. As mentioned earlier, Singaporeans are actually markedly more satisfied with their national leaders and convinced of their good intentions than Americans. The Global Barometer survey finds that Singapore’s Prime Minister and National Government enjoy extremely high trust; they are tied for the third most-trusted on a list of thirteen national institution. Compared to Americans, Singaporeans show little interest in “giving people more say”; just 19.7% make this a top priority, compared to 32.6% of Americans.
Even critics of the PAP seem to endorse the deference hypothesis. Mutalib, for example, finds it “imperative” to “highlight the success of the government in the economy,” then immediately adds:
Obviously, such a success in turning Singapore into an affluent country accords the government a high degree of “performance legitimacy.” This in turn directly impairs the Opposition’s image and effectiveness and also explains its inconsequential role in this Republic.
Note that “performance legitimacy” is almost synonymous with “deference.” Mutalib goes on to explain that current PAP candidates are widely seen as more competent than the opposition: “[M]any in the Opposition leadership today have neither a university education nor a successful professional career. Elitist as this may sound, this educational factor has proven to rank high in voter preferences, as confirmed by media reports all these years.” Mauzy and Milne similarly argue that PAP leaders have constantly strived to expand their competence edge over rival parties:
As early as 1959… Lee Kuan Yew said, “It is a battle of ideals and ideas. And the side that recruits more ability and more talent will be the side that wins.” Lee has always had a strong preference for those who perform well scholastically, particularly in the sciences. Some of the other early party stalwarts had concerns about focusing so narrowly, but his view, modified a bit in the mid-1970s, has prevailed. Therefore, the “combing of every nook and cranny of Singapore” for political talent has typically gone outside the party…
While the deference story does fairly well, there is also considerable evidence that resignation matters, too. Singaporeans’ unusually low professed interest in politics is telling. Only 3.2% of Singaporeans say they are “very interested,” and another 32.8% say that are “somewhat interest”; in the U.S., the corresponding numbers are 18.3% and 47.2%. Mutalib (2004: 358) reports that three decades worth of studies of National University of Singapore undergraduates judge them to be “politically unaware, disinterested, and apathetic.” The World Values Survey consistently finds that compared to Americans, Singaporeans are extremely reluctant to engage in even low-level political participation, such as signing a petition or attending a rally. The stereotype of the apolitical Singaporean appears to have much basis in fact.
Overall, it looks like the solution to the paradoxes of Singaporean political economy lies within the family of “party preference” stories. The challenge is figuring out which variant or variants best fits the facts. Deference and resignation seem to play major roles in Singapore’s politics. But more systematic evidence is necessary to cement these conclusions – and test whether pure loyalty to the PAP matters too.
Conclusion
In the West, Singapore is widely perceived as a benevolent dictatorship. From this starting point, social scientists have little to learn from Singaporean political economy: The explanation for Singapore’s success is simply that it had the good fortune to be ruled by the smartest, nicest dictators on earth.
Once one corrects Western misconceptions about Singapore’s democratic credentials, though, the city-state looks curiouser and curiouser. Singapore seems to contradict everything that economists and political scientists think they know about democracy: How can any party honestly win election after election – much less a party committed to many economically efficient but unpopular policies?
Given the scarcity of data, I can only begin to answer this question. Still, there is little reason to believe that Singaporean voters are markedly more economically literate than voters in other countries. The secret to Singapore’s success seems to lie in its electorate’s “party preference” for a ruling party that happens to take economic reasoning seriously. Party preferences in favor of the PAP give it enough slack to impose policies that would not survive a direct popular vote. There is convincing evidence in favor of both the deference and resignation interpretations of Singaporeans’ party preferences, but the topic deserves further study.
Understanding the paradoxes of Singaporean political economy sheds new light on political economy in general. While most democracies have frequent partisan turnover at the national level, sub-national democratic politics are often as one-sided as in Singapore. In the broader world, though, one-party democracy does not seem to depend on the delivery of remarkable economic performance. Is this because the relative importance of loyalty, deference, and resignation varies? Or did Singapore simply have the good fortune to put blind trust in men who coincidentally deserved it?
Once political economists have a better handle on one-party democracy, they will be ready to take a second look at national politics. Why exactly is it so hard for one party in a democracy to stay on top at the national level? One interesting hypothesis is simply that people are more interested in – and therefore less resigned about – national politics. But this raises further questions: What determines whether a given democratic contest will catch voters’ interest? And under what circumstances does greater interest lead to worse policies?
It is easy to find fascination in Singapore. Observers around the world have been intrigued by its economy, history, policies, culture, cuisine, and architecture. My research on Singapore has convinced me that its political economy deserves to be added to the list of “the most fascinating things about Singapore.” It is an illuminating challenge to time-tested models of how democracy works. But more importantly, the mechanisms underlying Singaporean political economy are probably at work in every democracy. These mechanisms are not unique to Singapore, just uniquely visible.
That’s the end of it. Another day, perhaps, I’ll try to show in what ways I find this case refreshing, and others in which I find it inadequate.
Piaroh-Cze:
Perfect information against perfect impartiality.
City. State. City-state. A wondrous conundrum.
One with equally wondrous implications.
I doubt anyone read the papers over the past few days with as much interest as I did, but recently Singapore’s legal heavyweights have emerged to tackle the tough questions that are often aimed at our judicial and political systems as levelled by most Western observers.
To see the replies, don’t bother with Western papers. Try the ToC instead.
But anyway, I appreciate many of the points. One in particular echoed a thought I had germed some time ago, but only recently developed.
Singapore is a city-state. Undeniable.
That means that we have some characteristics of a city, and some characteristics of a state. Still with me so far?
We also blur the lines at some points. In some cases we are more city than state, and in others we are more state than city and no one is to say which is more desirable. We agree.
Running Singapore might therefore in many aspects more resemble running a big city or metropolis than a full nation.
Like New York.
Which, of its elected city council, has 45 out of 48 seats occupied by Democrats.
No one calls New York undemocratic.
No one says that the Democrats are unfairly squeezing the opposition. Or maybe some people do, but no one’s blasting the Democrats for it.
No one thinks that having such utter domination by one party is a bad thing in New York. Although one can of course easily argue that the fractious Democrats can never really dominate anything.
So why blast the PAP for their death grip on our Parliament?
This isn’t satire. I’m deadly serious. New York’s bigger, has a larger population, GDP to beat ours. If they’re a ‘city’ and not a ‘country’ then by all that makes sense so are we.
A damn city. If New York with 45 Democrats in 48 seats can be the icon of the democratic money West so can Singapore in Southeast Asia.
So. Lefty editors. Especially if you live in Manhattan. Shut the hell up.
The next bit I take no credit for, because it was raised by our Law Minister.
The Western media cries stifling and silencing whenever confronted by Singaporean authorities because they’re so unused to having a leash. Any sort of leash.
Part of it is due to the competition. Look at their news. See how they sensationalize relatively minor crimes by bringing on ‘experts’ to offer opinions. They do so authoritatively, practically announcing verdicts and sentences before the case ever gets to court. Whichever station has the best ‘expert’ gets the best ratings, and whichever floats the best, or most exciting, theories about what happened gets the most commercial ad offers. CSI meets CNN.
The leader of the free world. News programmes. Where’s the presumption of innocence? Where’s the trial before sentence? Or should we just lynch the guy without waiting for the judge?
If anyone tried that in Singapore, the AG would had started proceedings against both the network and the ‘expert’. But that doesn’t happen in the West, like how you print cartoons of Muslim prophets or call your president an idiot in print and get away with it. They aren’t used to it and they cry foul whenever someone tries to remind them. Well to be the fair, the PAP isn’t very good at gentle reminders.
Strange, really.
Piaroh-Cze:
Stop, people, what’s that sound, everybody look what’s going down.
We may be entering a new Cold War.
I know, I know, I know what I’ve said before about Cold War mentalities. But I do think this is a Cold War, just with very different characteristics and to a new level of sophistication such that we cannot stick with the old mentality. We need a new Cold War mindset.
Of course, the protagonists will be China and the US. But let’s not put the cart before the horse.
Theoretically, China now has the means to completely wreck the US, and by extension global, economy simply by dumping its T-Bills. Unfortunately for Beijing, it can’t really do that under the current economic system because that would trigger a massive meltdown of its own holdings.
What it can do, however, would be to shake that stick every now and then at Washington, which certainly can, rather perversely, shake back with its own debt. Inflating the debt rapidly would force devaluation, effectively killing Beijing’s liquidity but also leaving the US in shambles.
If you’ve not drawn the parallel yet, let me shout it in your face: this is the 21st Century equivalent of Mutually Assured Destruction. A lot more bloodless than the sort Moscow threatened back in its day, a lot more subtle, but it will be no less tense.
We can thus expect that leaders of both sides will be busy trying to figure the new algorithm for winning. Proxy wars were once abound in the old Cold War, and now may be again, albeit fought with industries and human resource rather than nations and militias. Washington for one will be racking its brains over how its brilliant masterplan of forcing the USSR to spend itself into the grave came back to bite itself in the butt. The Chinese will be no less anxious about uncovering the flaws in the Soviet approach to securing resources in order to better avoid them.
There will be rumblings of course, and the economic equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis one day. Perhaps some Chinese company will attempt the takeover of GM? One thing is just as sure: the two behemoths are just as likely to start a currency and trade war as the US and USSR were to start a nuclear or conventional one.
In short, not so likely. Well, at least most of the time, so I really wouldn’t worry about another global economic superstructure shakeup any time soon.
This dynamic hasn’t quite caught on yet, and to no surprise really. Any war, let along a Cold one, gets bad press. The Russians, hankering after an honorary seat in the West, wouldn’t like to be told that their pursuits have every likelihood of becoming a sideshow. And in a world where the lake which matters is the Pacific, Continental Europe is chump change. They haven’t quite realized it, and both sides of the Pacific would really rather keep things that way. There’s no telling where Old World defiance, arrogance and xenophobia could end up.
I suppose we’ll see if I’m right or wrong then. But for those of you seeking to put me down quickly by suggesting that China can’t compete because its military and diplomatic clout nowhere match the US’, I’d remind you that the USSR matched the US only in one aspect out of any dozens of measures, but that was enough because that was the one which mattered. In the 21st Century, it’s starting to look like money is the only dimension which matters.
I do forecast that this Cold War will be carried out behind so many smiles and handshakes one could scarcely imagine the rivalry. After all, business is business is business, and whatever business is, we prefer it to be as bloodless as possible.
Piaroh-Cze:
Murder, is bad for business.
Many of us with the Western perspective of the global are easily confounded by the idea that China can be so easily offended. We find that their assertions and accusations of a ‘Cold War’ mentality a little on the ridiculous.
I admit, until recently I was one of the guilty. Then the latest cover of The Economist, for some reason, touched me. It was an image that was far from extraordinary. In fact, I had probably seen it hundreds of times before, in the exact same context and presentation.
Which was precisely the problem.
Few things can express our concepts as bluntly and frankly as cartoons and caricatures. Their humour license allows them to push acceptable boundaries. In fact, one could easily argue that their function is precisely to discover just where exactly have the lines been drawn, then as deliberately as they can, cross it.
In cartoons and caricatures, there are two main ways in which we tend to represent countries. Animals are popular choices. The American Eagle, Russian Bear, Indian Elephant/Tiger, Chinese Dragon etc. But those are mere mascots. Far more impressionable are the faces we use.
Uncle Sam is quite literally the face of the US, rivalled perhaps only by George Washington on the greenback. But Sam is the one to grace newspaper comics. Perhaps once upon a time Uncle Joe took his place in the opposing panel, but that was an age that ceased two decades ago; it is now improper to identify Joe with Moscow so overtly. Even hawks would hesitate.
But how about China? Why do we persist with the Mao caricatures? Why has the Economist printed the plump, smiling face of Uncle Mao alongside the wrinkled, gaunt stare of Uncle Sam?
Little wonder that the Chinese still perceive the West as stuck in the Cold War. Even if we don’t realize it, Mao has moved into the past. China today is no longer Mao’s China, he does not belong to the present or this age. The Chinese know it, they feel it in their heart and bones.
So long as the West continues to cast China with Mao, failing to adjust to a more generic Chinese figurehead, or one more relevant such as Deng Xiaoping, or dare I say, Wen Jiabao, then we cannot blame China, can we, for its reactions?
Are they being oversensitive? Maybe, but to lack consideration for them would be to be insensitive. After all, if one cannot tell from their nationalistic proclamations the importance of keeping up appearances to Beijing, then one really shouldn’t be fit to comment.
Piaroh-Cze:
Only an idiot would jeer at the darkness dwelt in by those who are shrouded by his shadow.
A couple of you have requested me for the essay. I appreciate it. I do. I want to send it to the both of you, I think your opinions would be valuable, or at least (if the green uniform has indeed dulled your mind so much) interesting.
But I have received a notice bearing a routine statement (or so it was printed) that I ought not divulge the contents of my essay until the results are released in March 2010 earliest, thereby giving the powers-that-be sufficient time to clear it for open access.
Doesn’t help that my colleagues elsewhere remain tightlipped on the issue.
Very sorry, but it looks like you’re going to have to wait six months or so.
Piaroh-Cze:
The most powerful words humanity have ever known must all pass through a single, small and easily sealed gap.
Putin is one of those people you always take seriously, even if he’s joking. So when he makes a stopover in Beijing, you’d best pay attention.
During the visit, Moscow and Beijing approved a “framework” agreement on Russian supplies of natural gas to China, an issue that continues to be held up by details of cost and logistics. Downplaying the two countries’ continued failure to finalize a natural gas deal, Putin said that such details should be worked out at the enterprise level. Talk of a natural gas pipeline between Russia and China has been under way for years, but the cost of constructing a pipeline from Kovytka through the mountains to China has remained a sticking point, as has the contracted price for the gas itself. Moscow has in the past shown little interest in paying for the infrastructure necessary to deliver the gas, and China has been unwilling to foot the bill since it can look to less costly (economically and politically) alternatives, such as Central Asia and Myanmar.
Things have changed, otherwise this wouldn’t be happening. As it is so often, the basic economics have not yielded, but the political winds have shifted. The international stage has thrust roles on these giant actors, and they seem ready to play it full.
For long Russia has tried to gain leverage by playing China and Japan off each other over the oil pipeline; each is fearful of losing the regional high ground if the line passes through the other’s territory first. Moscow has shrewdly sought to maximise economic benefit where it is probable to be found, but also to win power play concessions.
Russia does not necessarily have Japan to use as leverage in the natural gas pipeline game (Tokyo is already involved in the Sakhalin project, and South Korea, which also hopes to tap Russian gas, is too small a player to balance Chinese interests). Instead, Russia has held out the prospect of natural gas shipments to China as a demonstration of cooperative relations between Moscow and Beijing. The only bait that works on the Dragon.
Putin’s visit isn’t so much about signing a few billion-dollar deals. As a matter of fact, it’s chump change compared to what world order they have in mind. ather, Moscow is looking to gauge Beijing’s stance on the intensifying standoff between Russia and the United States. As Moscow takes a more confrontational posture on issues like Poland, Ukraine, Iran and Georgia, it wants to be sure that China is on its side, or at least is not going to turn against Russia.
The last time things began to take a turn for the worse, Mao had Nixon over for tea. With Obama’s charisma still bright in the Asia-Pacific, Moscow is keen to avoid a repeat of that scenario. China’s response, however, remains guarded at best.
Beijing sees the US as weakened. Washington is tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, facing off against Iran (and not making a strong showing) and still mired in the global economic downturn. Obama is under siege in Congress, with the least likely of allies and most damaging of enemies. Pentagon is grumbling and rumbling in dissent. The Treasury is bleeding itself white, while Cabinet and White House Staff look ready to draw swords on each other.
In the meantime, China has stepped out into the international arena, offering to help alleviate the global financial situation, taking a rhetorical lead on addressing global warming and offering its good services to resolve the N. Korean nuclear issue. Beijing does not see the US as down and out — just down. They are wise in that way. The Chinese leadership sees a limited window of opportunity to ensconce China if not as an equal to the US, at least into a stronger position in the global political order and economic architecture that emerges over the coming years.
Certainly Beijing wants to take advantage of the perceived US weakness to limit the resurgence of US power, at least in Asia-Pacific, but it is reluctant to directly challenge Washington. Talk of new currencies and diversified reserves aside, China remains economically tied to the United States, and is still far from developing a robust domestic market or finding alternatives to the US consumer.
For Beijing to sign on with Moscow and risk its economic relations with Washington at this point, China needs some significant guarantees that the cost will be worth the potential payout. And this is in part where the gas deal comes into play. Beijing holds the cards now, Moscow will be expected to shoulder the infrastructure costs as a clear sign of commitment.
China is unlikely to be swayed so quickly, however, as Russia for years made promises and then backtracked on the oil pipeline agreements. Beijing is also waiting to hear Washington’s counteroffer in November, when Obama visits. The Bear is stretching its back after a two-decade hibernation, it doesn’t want the newly awoken Dragon bringing winter to the Eagle’s eyrie again so soon.
Piaroh-Cze:
To balance anything, even power, you need a fulcrum first.
A couple of weeks ago I submitted an essay for the annual COA Competition. It had a title the same as this post.
No prizes for guessing the subject matter.
I shan’t publish it here. It might draw unwanted attention from my own snook colleagues. But I’ll be willing to share it with the select few friends with whom I know I can discuss such matters without reservation.
Therefore, you should be so confident/thick-skinned/arrogant as to believe yourself a member of this select group, feel free to contact me. I’ll dispel any doubts.
I do warn you though, those 3000 words were not written with the act of reading in mind; even I myself find it difficult to plough through at times.
Piaroh-Cze:
The fastest with the mustest.
Barack Obama Nobel Peace Prize?
What the hell?
OK, let’s take a look at his foreign policy.
1: Make a stump speech in Cairo. Plus. Sort of.
2: Can’t make up his mind on what to do in Afghanistan. Minus.
3: Killed a couple of insurgent leaders in Pakistan. Ought to be a plus, but not really the sort of thing a Nobel laureate should be condoning.
4: N. Korea still has nukes. Oh, and they’re still not negotiating. And guess what, when they eventually do start again, China’s the one getting the credit. Big minus.
5: Hey look, Iran has new toys. Shiny centrifuges, and it ain’t even Christmas yet. Minus.
6: Struck a deal with the Russians about NATO military supply routes. OK, a definite plus. (Finally)
7: Bent to the Russians over the missile shield. I’m a little iffy either way.
8: Kept his mouth wisely shut on Xinjiang. Hmm, tricky, foreign policy plus, but Nobel minus.
9: Managed to get Netanyahu to spit out the words ‘Palestinian state’. Plus, but a teeny one because he only did it once.
10: Withdrawing from Iraq! Er, wait, that’s Bush’s plan and Bush’s timetable he’s using.
11: Issuing interrogation guidelines that ban torture! Wait again, er, those were issued in Bush’s last year too, Obama just er, reaffirmed them.
12: Closed Guantanamo Bay! Yea OK. Now what?
13: Cutting nuclear arms with the Russians. More a case of right place right time than any real diplomacy on his part, the old agreements are expiring.
14: Improved relations with traditional allies. Gee, you might think if that were true, Canada and Japan may think twice before insisting firmly on their pre-set Afghanistan withdrawal dates in 2010. Maybe continental Europe wouldn’t be so wishy-washy on the matter either.
15: Didn’t meet the Dalai Lama. Look, I think the Dalai Lama’s a doddling fool but hey this is the Nobels we’re talking about. The 2009 winner refusing an audience requested by the 1989 winner? What? MINUS.
16: Stood by during the debacle of an Iranian election. Again foreign policy plus, Nobel minus.
The way I’m looking at things, all the successes so far have been limited and transient while the failures have come from indecision and lack of leadership. Not exactly Nobel material. In fact, the only lasting success he’s got would be those books he wrote.
So let me guess, in 2012, it’s going to be Dr Phil for President huh?
Come on, the dude’s barely warmed his own seat in the Oval Office. This is not the way to give a man a pat on the back and reassure him he’s not doing too badly. I mean, what the heck? Bill Clinton did a whole lot more good over his term, but I don’t see him getting anything.
Maybe they’re just really relieved he hasn’t gone and started another war somewhere else. Then in that case I think Putin should be a joint recipient. And Hu Jintao too.
I’m starting to think that the Nobels are starting to become like a high-brow equivalent of the Oscars. The celebrities and the weirdos take turns to win and pretend it means something. Doesn’t help that the critics are quite immune to public opinion. Love democracy.
Almost makes you wish for John McCain, but unfortunately for you Republican buffs if it were him the situation might be worse. He might be more decisive and perceptive on such matters, but he would also be even more divisive to Congress. Even less would get done, though through no real fault of his. It’d be the Democrats’ own petty politics again.
I’ll put it this way. The only reason why Obama’s receiving the award will be because Scandinavians are in charge of deciding who gets it, and Scandinavians are former Vikings who had long ago forsook their plundering and glorious ancestry to consort with liberal utopia. Let’s just say that if it were up to the Chinese, Japanese, Indians, Russians, ConEuropeans, Sunnis, Shiites, Hispanics, Anglo-Saxons or even Africans (outside of Kenya), he wouldn’t be receiving anything at all.
Serious now. Obama’s star power isn’t just fading, it’s turning into a liability. The Nobel crystallizes how his celebrity status is going to start drawing more and more trouble than support.
For one thing, politicians, both domestic and foreign, and finding it difficult to express their disagreement with him. Democrats will disagree with their president, that’s a fact of nature. Republicans will oppose a Democrat in office, duh. Europe and Washington and can never really see perfectly eye-to-eye on just about everything. Russia always has an opinion, China always thinks they’re being hedged against. These are definites, givens and taken for granted in the world.
Obama’s star power is starting to generate tensions for the simple reason that countries, Iran and Co. aside, and finding it difficult to voice their disagreements with an image as Obama’s. They risk making themselves into the jackass of international diplomacy. Obama’s like a sacred cow who can’t be touched.
Previously under Bush, the world could be frank. Everyone could afford to disagree openly with the US. Now, the few who try are pariahs. The Nobel is going perfectly crystallize, then exacerbate this situation.
All that said, let’s hear the speech.
Piaroh-Cze:
The elephant of Damocles.
